Putin’s Nuclear Strategy Prevents Diplomatic end to Russo-Ukrainian War
In a meeting on September 25th, President Vladimir Putin warned NATO that if Russia or its allies are attacked by a nation supported by a nuclear power, Russia reserves the right to retaliate using nuclear weapons. Since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, the Russo-Ukrainian War has been further complicated by Russia’s demonstrated potential for nuclear retaliation. While these weapons have not been deployed in the region, Putin’s frequent hints at Russia’s nuclear capabilities have significantly influenced the trajectory of the war. With Russia’s threats of nuclear escalation shaping the trajectory of the conflict, Putin may be strategically preventing a peaceful end to the war in Ukraine.
By threatening mass destruction, nuclear weapons have the potential to aggravate conflict. Their use could have catastrophic repercussions for both the attacker and the target, as well as greater consequences on a global scale. During the Russo-Ukrainian War, Putin’s nuclear deterrence capability has aggravated conflict in the region by limiting the actions of Ukraine and its allies. In this way, Russia’s nuclear arsenal allows Putin to effectively deter any military assistance to Ukraine perceived as threatening, including a direct NATO intervention.
Not only have nuclear weapons aggravated the conflict itself, but the threat of their use also creates substantial challenges when considering the conflict reconciliation process. With any miscalculation having the potential to escalate into a direct nuclear exchange, Moscow’s threats may prevent attempts at diplomatic solutions from Ukraine and its allies. Unlike a conventional war where one party might negotiate a surrender after assuming significant losses, nuclear-armed states, such as Russia, can surpass negotiation with the means to secure a total win. Nearly three years since the beginning of the war, diplomatic efforts to end the conflict swiftly may have been unsuccessful due to Russia’s capability to continue its campaign without fear of total defeat.
Since the onset of the war, Putin has frequently hinted at Russia’s capability for a nuclear attack against Ukraine. In April of 2022, Russia notified the United States that they were testing a new long-range ballistic missile. In March of 2023, Russia deployed tactical nuclear weapons to Belarus. On September 25th, Putin made yet another nuclear threat against NATO members, solidifying his pursuit of a total military victory against Ukrainian forces. This development makes the war considerably more dangerous for Ukraine and its allies. Whether as a response to Ukrainian advances or as a deterrent against Western support, Putin’s nuclear threats introduce an element of disorder into the war.
Ukraine faces a critical dilemma when confronted with the future of war. On one hand, with global support for Russia on the decline, NATO-backed Ukraine possesses the military equipment and personnel to bring about an end to the war. On the other hand, Ukrainian forces may be cautious of provoking a retaliation response from Russia. This dilemma effectively freezes the conflict in place, as neither side is willing to risk a scenario where nuclear weapons use becomes a reality.
Ukraine’s dilemma leads us to a critical question. If the threat of nuclear destruction is so instrumental to Putin’s war strategy, what is preventing Russia from ultimately securing a total victory in Ukraine? One explanation has to do with the strategic paradox of deterrence. As both groups hesitate to fully commit resources or adopt aggressive strategies towards victory, Russia’s threat of nuclear escalation may be discouraging the frequency and severity of direct engagements in the region. Thus, Putin may effectively be creating a stalemate with neither Russia nor Ukraine securing sufficient victories on the battlefield.
There are several solutions to the problem of nuclear escalation circulating global institutions today, many of which are rooted in disarmament and non-proliferation attempts. One such attempt is the New START Treaty, which aims to limit the number of deployed nuclear warheads worldwide. However, these types of treaties require unanimous global adherence to be effective. Russia’s discontinuation of such agreements, as seen with its withdrawal from New START in 2023, has halted treaty attempts at arms control. With Russian leaders rejecting a U.S. proposal to resume talks of an arms control treaty, it is unlikely Putin plans to rejoin New START or enter into a similar treaty with the United States.
The revival of a global commitment to nuclear disarmament is essential. Major global military powers, with support from international organizations like the United Nations, must push for renewed diplomatic measures to secure steps towards controlling nuclear arms, even amid conflicts involving the threat of their use. Additionally, strategies to maintain mutual trust between nuclear powers, such as greater transparency measures and faithful agreements on how such weapons ought to be managed, could also reduce the risk of escalation. Arbitration attempts involving a neutral, trusted party will likely play a key role in this process by monitoring nuclear arsenals and enforcing agreements.
As demonstrated throughout the Russo-Ukrainian War, the threat of nuclear retaliation functions both as a deterrent against–and a catalyst for–catastrophic escalation. Putin’s recent nuclear threats have added barriers to resolution by preventing essential diplomatic solutions from Ukraine and its allies. As nuclear technology evolves, the future of war and peace lies in a revived global faith in disarmament efforts, as well as an emphasis on trust-building strategies between nations and global institutions. Certainly, the existence of nuclear weapons ought not to stand in the way of attempts at peace. These weapons are better suited as deterrents against war, not tools of it.